Ida mac os x torrent
Since this decoding routine was not located inside a single function, where we can just set a single breakpoint and dump all the decoded strings passed to it, but instead it was (voluntary?) copy pasted every-time the author needed to decode one single encrypted string and since OSX/Tarmac have many strings to decrypt at runtime, writing an IDAPython script was super necessary to automatically decode them all (and save us a lot of time)Ī first challenge will be to locate these strings inside the binary and extract them accordingly.
![ida mac os x torrent ida mac os x torrent](https://treethebig788.weebly.com/uploads/1/2/4/9/124959147/965760333.jpg)
Main python script to decode OSX/Tarmac encrypted strings This would be a total bypass of macOS built-in malware security features, in fact, that’s exactly what OSX/Shlayer will use to launch OSX/Tarmac and with administrator privileges! So, what happens if this malware wasn’t downloaded by a quarantine aware application, like the curl command line? The extended quarantine attribute will not be set for this malware, so none of GateKeeper nor XProtect will kick in, no user consent pop-up will be shown and the malware will just execute.
![ida mac os x torrent ida mac os x torrent](https://br.web.img3.acsta.net/r_1280_720/medias/nmedia/18/73/64/49/19243632.jpg)
The problem is not all of macOS applications are quarantine aware. These attributes are essential for GateKeeper/XProtect to kick in and start their magic to analyze this malware, if all goes well a user consent pop-up will be shown, warning the user before running this file, or if this file turns out to be malicious no options but to remove this file will be shown. Since this file was downloaded by Safari, (or any other quarantine aware Browser/Application, like Chrome.app or Mail.app), extended attributes will be added for this file, in the HFS+/APFS file system, especially the quarantine attributes. Even though with a fake identity but this Apple Developer certificate is still signed by Apple thus the malware is allowed to run after some preliminary checks. Signing malware with Apple developer certificates, not only it is easy to do, but became a standard practice for macOS malware developers and that’s one of the reasons why Gatekeeper and XProtect are failing to stop this malware: it is signed. Indeed, that’s not the official Adobe installer but a fake Flash Player installer that was signed using an Apple developer certificate 2L27TJZBZM issued probably to a fake identity named : Fajar Budiarto Today’s OSX/Shlayer is still delivered through bad ads, thanks to Confiant real-time Malvertising tracking platform, we stumbled upon a malicious Advertiser who redirects victims matching certain criteria (coming from certain countries, or using macOS computers) to the following landing page, offering yet another fake Adobe Flash Player update:
IDA MAC OS X TORRENT TORRENT
First discovered in 2018, OSX/Shlayer came via a fake Flash Player updater appearing in bitTorrent file sharing websites when a user attempts to select a link to copy a torrent magnet link. OSX/Shlayer has been a very common macOS malware this year, most of the time delivered through bad ads.
![ida mac os x torrent ida mac os x torrent](http://newmidnight159.weebly.com/uploads/1/2/5/0/125048919/701433365.jpg)
All these little things might convince any threat actor to look after Apple devices, and include them into the scope of targets. Finally, Apple devices are trendy, sometimes considered as a wealth indicator, or simply becoming more useful in millions of people’s everyday life. Weak malware built-in security features: macOS ships with GateKeeper and XProtect, but both of these protections can be by-passed by new malware. Cyber criminals, APT groups, nation state actors, are extensively targeting Apple iOS/MacOS devices for various reasons: continuous innovation and development of Apple platforms leads ultimately to new attack surfaces (and more 0-days sold in the underground). MacOS malware is becoming a serious threat to mac users.